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1ON THE COINCIDENCE OF THE FEEDBACK NASH AND
STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIA IN ECONOMIC
APPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
Santiago J. Rubio
ABSTRACT
In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilib-
rium concept in diﬀerential games is investigated. Firstly, it is showed that
for a class of diﬀerential games with state-interdependence the stationary
feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Stackel-
berg equilibrium independently of the player being the leader of the game.
Secondly, suﬃcient conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the two
equilibria are deﬁned. A review of diﬀerent economic models shows that this
coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of
diﬀerential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting
in which diﬀerential games are deﬁned. In this setting the ﬁrst movement
advantage of the leader may disappears and then both equilibria coincide.
Keywords: diﬀerential games, stationary feedback Nash equilibrium, sta-
tionary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, coincidence.
JEL classiﬁc a t i o n :C 7 3 ;D 6 2 ;H 4 1 ;Q 2 0 ;Q 3 0
21 Introduction
Diﬀerential games have been used in economics to study the strategic in-
terdependence among agents in a dynamic framework.1 From the numerous
economic applications of diﬀe r e n t i a lg a m e sw ew o u l dl i k et om e n t i o nt h e
ones developed by Ba¸ sar, Haurie and Ricci (1985), van der Ploeg and de
Zeeuw (1990), Gradus (1991) and Rubio and Escriche (2001). In these pa-
pers, devoted to diﬀerent issues, is explicitly recognized that the feedback
Nash equilibrium coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. This
happens in the modiﬁed Lancaster game of capitalism where the feedback
Nash equilibrium and the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, with the workers
being the leader, are identical, see Ba¸ sar, Haurie and Ricci (1985, p. 103);
in the model of competitive arms accumulation studied by van der Ploeg
and de Zeeuw (1990, p. 133) where for the two players the feedback Nash
equilibrium coincides with the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium; in Gradus’s
(1991, p. 173) model of optimal dynamic proﬁtt a x a t i o nw h e r et h ef e e d b a c k
Nash equilibrium and the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, with the gov-
ernment being the leader, are identical, and also in the model of long-term
bilateral interaction between a resource-exporting cartel and a coalition of
governments of resource-importing countries developed by Rubio and Es-
criche (2001, p. 304) where the feedback Nash equilibrium coincides with
the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium when the resource cartel acts as the
leader of the game.
The aim of this paper is to investigate how general is this coincidence,
or in other words, to evaluate the scope of the applicability of the Stackel-
berg equilibrium concept in diﬀerential games. With this objective in mind
we deﬁne a class of diﬀerential games with state-interdependence and we
show that for this class of diﬀerential games both equilibria are identical
independently of the player being the leader of the game. The main charac-
teristic of this class of diﬀerential games is that the strategic interdependence
among agents appears exclusively through the state variable so that in this
framework one agents’s decisions only aﬀect the payoﬀ of the rest of agents
through his/her inﬂuence on the dynamics of the state variable. Then given
the continuous-time setting in which diﬀerential games are deﬁned the ﬁrst
movement advantage disappears and the two equilibria coincide.
In the second part of the paper we review a set of economic applica-
tions of diﬀerential games that belong to this class of diﬀerential games with
state-interdependence, and we check that for all of them the feedback Nash
1See Dockner et al. (2000) for an excellent survey on diﬀerential games applications in
economics and management science.
3equilibrium is identical to the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. These ex-
amples go from diﬀerential games with stock externalities as can be the case
of the model of international pollution control developed by Dockner and
Long (1993) until the dynamic models of duopoly developed by Fershtman
and Kamien (1987) or Reynolds (1987). The conclusion of this review is that
the class of diﬀerential games deﬁned in this paper cover a good number
of interesting economic applications of diﬀerential games and that, conse-
quently, for all of them the leadership position does not give any advantage
to the leader. This conclusion should not be understood as a criticism of the
Stackelberg equilibrium concept but as a limitation of the diﬀerential games.
This limitation, as we have already pointed out, appears as a consequence of
the continuous-time setting in which diﬀerential games are deﬁned.2
Finally, we deﬁne suﬃcient conditions for getting this result. These con-
ditions guarantee that the reaction functions are orthogonal with respect to
the control variables so that an agent’s optimal policy only depends on the
state variable. In this way we extend our previous result to a broader class of
diﬀerential games economic applications. We also discuss some examples of
diﬀerential games that do not ﬁt exactly to the class of diﬀerential games with
state-interdependence and that present this coincidence between both equi-
libria. The paper is organized as follows, in the next Section the deﬁnitions
of a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium and of a stationary Stackelberg
equilibrium are presented and the coincidence of both equilibria for a class
of diﬀerential games with state-interdependence is showed. In Section 3,
diﬀerent economic models where the leadership does not play any role are
discussed and in Section 4, suﬃcient conditions for the equivalence between
the two equilibria are presented. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2All the examples reviewed in Section 2 of this paper are linear quadratic diﬀerential
games although each of them with a diﬀerent structure. However, our conclusion about
the equivalence of both equilibria is more general and applies for any diﬀerential game
that presents a state-interdependence.
42A c l a s s o f d i ﬀerential games with state-
interdependence
Let us deﬁne a diﬀerential game with two players, i =1 ,2, where x(t) stands
for the vector of state variables, x(t) ∈ L, being L ⊆ Rn, and ui(t) the vector
control variables of the player i, ui(t) ∈ Ui, being Ui ⊆ Rmi.3 Both players are
inﬁnitely lived and have strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable utility functions
that depend on the state and control variables, vi(x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t)). The dy-
namics of the sate variables is deﬁned by functions: fj(x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t)),j=
1,...,n, which are twice diﬀerentiable. Then the diﬀerential game between







−rt vi (x(t),u1 (t),u2 (t))dt (1)
s.t. ˙ xj(t)=fj(x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t)),x j(0) = xj0 ≥ 0,
where r is the players’ rate of discount and i =1 ,2 and j =1 ,...,n.
For the information structure, we consider a feedback or closed-loop infor-
mation structure.4 Given a domain of the state space L, player i s feedback
strategy is thus expressed as a function on a time-state variable space (i.e.,
ui = ui(t,x) deﬁned on [0,∞) × L) . B u ti nt h i sp a p e r ,w ef o c u so nas t a -
tionary Markov strategy (i.e., ui = ui(x) deﬁned on L). Formally, we have
the following deﬁnition of player i s strategy space.
Deﬁnition 1 STATIONARY FEEDBACK STRATEGY SPACE. The sta-
tionary feedback strategy space for player i is the set Si = {ui(x):ui(x) is a
function of x ∈ L and ui(x) ∈ Ui}.
The feedback strategies describe decision rules that prescribe a value for
the control variables as a function of the observed value of the state variables.
Players in this case do not commit themselves to a particular path at the
outset and can respond to diﬀerent values they observe. It is now straight-
forward to present the deﬁnition of stationary feedback Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 STATIONARY FEEDBACK NASH EQUILIBRIUM. A sta-
tionary feedback Nash equilibrium is a pair of stationary feedback strategies
(u∗
1,u ∗








3Usually, economic considerations determine both the domain of the state space and the
domain of the strategy space. For the moment, we do not impose an additional constraint
on these domains.
4In the traditional diﬀerential games literature, see Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1999), feedback
strategies are known as well as Markov strategies.
5for every ui ∈ Si, (i,k =1 ,2; i  = k).
Feedback strategies provide a subgame perfect equilibrium that is dynam-
ically consistent. Subgame perfectness requires that for every subgame, the
restriction of a strategy pair (u∗
1,u ∗
2) to the subgame remain an equilibrium
in that subgame.
In order to compare this equilibrium concept with the stationary feed-
back Stackelberg equilibrium concept, we proceed to oﬀer a deﬁnition of this
equilibrium.
Stipulating an asymmetry in the roles of the players, let player 1 be the
leader, announcing a particular path for his control variables, uo
1(t) ∈ Ui ﬁrst,
to which player 2 reacts optimally by maximizing J2(uo
1,u 2) over u2 ∈ U2.













1 ,u2 )} (2)
is a singleton, so that there exists a unique mapping T2 : U1 → U2 with the
property
J2(u1,T 2(u1)) = max
u2∈U2
J2 (u1 ,u2 ), for every u1∈ U1 . (3)
T h e n ,i ti se a s yt og i v ead e ﬁnition of a stationary feedback Nash Stackelberg
equilibrium as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 STATIONARY FEEDBACK STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM.
A stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, with player 1 as the leader, is
a pair of stationary feedback strategies (u∗
1,u ∗
2) ∈ S1 × S2 such that for every
possible initial condition (t0,x 0):
u
∗








A stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium with player 2 as the leader
can be deﬁned analogously, by interchanging the roles of the players. Again
this equilibrium is subgame perfect and also dynamically consistent.
Next, we explain how the dynamic programming approach can be used
to calculate the equilibria we have just deﬁned.
For the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium strategies
(u∗
1,u ∗








ij (x)fj (x, u1 ,u2 )},i=1, 2 (4)
6where Vi(x) is the value for player i of the game that starts at x. Note that
although in the general case Vi is also a function of t and not just of the
state variable, it can be shown that if time enters the objective function of
the optimal control problem only through the discount term then the value
functions do not depend on t, see Kamien and Schwartz (1991, p. 238).










ji (x, u1 ,u2 )=0,i=1, 2. (5)
This system of equations implicitly deﬁned the reactions functions of the
two players, u1 = T1(u2 : x) and u2 = T2(u1 : x). Let us assume that functions
vi and fj present the suﬃcient properties to ﬁnd an unique solution to the












or, ﬁnally, as functions whose argument is the state variable: u∗
1 = χ1(x) and
u∗






ij (x)fj (x,χ1 (x),χ2 (x)),i=1, 2. (6)
Expression (6) de ﬁne s a system of two partials diﬀerential equations. By
solving this system and ﬁnding the value functions (V1(x),V 2(x)), we can also
ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies. Summarizing, we obtain
Proposition 1 A stationary feedback Nash equilibrium is given by a
solution of the ﬁrst -order part ial diﬀerential equation system (6).
Next, we focus on the stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium. Let
player 1 be the leader. Then the equilibrium strategy of the leader must








1j (x)fj (x, u1 ,T2 (u1 ; x)) }. (7)
The maximization of the right-hand side of the above equation yields
v






















7This equation implicitly deﬁnes the strategy of the leader. If we assume that
this equation has a unique solution, the explicit strategy of the leader can
be written, at the end, as a function of the state variable: u∗
1 = ψ(x). Using
this strategy and the reaction function of the follower, the strategy of this
player is written as: u∗
2 = T2(u1;x)=T2(ψ(x);x)=ω(x). Substituting then






ij (x)fj (x,ψ (x),ω (x)),i=1, 2. (9)
Expression (9) de ﬁnes a diﬀerent s ystem of two partial diﬀerential equa-
tions. By solving it the value functions are found (V1(x),V 2(x)) which allow
to calculate the equilibrium strategies. Summarizing, we present the follow-
ing result:
Proposition 2 A stationary feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is given
by a s ol uti o n o f t he ﬁrst-order partial diﬀerenti al eq uat i on s y st em (9) .
Next, we present a class of diﬀerential games with state-interdependence.
This class of diﬀerential games is characterized by a state equation which
depends linearly on the control variables:
fj (x, u1 ,u2 )=fj (x)+α j 1 u1 +αj 2 u2 ,j=1,...,n, (10)
where αj1 ∈ Rm1 and αj2 ∈ Rm2 are two vectors of constants. Moreover,
we assume that the objective function of the players does not depend on the
other player’s control variables:
vi (x, u1 ,u2 )=vi (x, ui ),i=1, 2. (11)
In this class of diﬀerential games the strategic interdependence between
the players only occurs through the state variable. In other words, the pay-
oﬀs of a player do not depend directly on the control variable of the other
player. The interdependence exists because the decisions of a player aﬀect
the pay-oﬀs of the other player, but this eﬀect only appears through the state
equation, i.e. through his/her inﬂuence on the dynamics of the state variable.
In this class of diﬀerential games the state variables can be considered as a
public good (bad).
For this class of diﬀerential games the maximization of the right-hand








ij (x)αij =0,i=1, 2. (12)
8Now, we have that the two equations are independents with respect to the
control variables. This means that the reaction function deﬁned by each
equation only depends on the sate variable, or, in other words, that the



















12 (x)=0, and the equation (8) is identical to
equation (5) and there i s no diﬀerence b e tween t he system of partial diﬀeren-
t i al e quat i ons ( 6) and ( 9) and, c ons equent l y, t he s tat i o nary f ee dback St ack-
elberg equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium.
Developingthisargument, wehavethatthesystemof partialdiﬀerenti al






ij(x)(fj(x)+αj1χ1(x)+αj2χ2(x)),i =1 ,2. (12)
For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-


















t hat i s t he s ame equat i o n t hat we c an ﬁnd in (12) for t he player 1, and, then,
u∗















which yields the same system of partial diﬀerenti al equati ons ( 13) t hat we
have obtained for the feedback Nash equilibrium. Obviously, this conclu-
sion is independent of which player be the leader. This argument yields the
following result:
Proposition 3 For the class of diﬀerential games with state externalities
de ﬁned by (10) and (11), the stationary feedback St ackelberg equilibri um co-
incides with the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium independently of the
player being the leader of the game.
9This result is a straightforward consequence of the continuous-time setting
in which the diﬀerential games are deﬁned. In this framework if there does
not exist any strategic interdependence through the control variables the ﬁrst
movement advantage disappears and the two equilibria coincide.
As we pointed out in the introduction this kind of equivalence in diﬀer-
ential games is already known. However, we do not have a clear idea on
the scope of the applicability of the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in dif-
ferential games. In the next Section we show that the class of diﬀerential
games with state-interdependence we have just deﬁned are very common in
the economic literature, so that for an important number of economic appli-
cations of the diﬀerential games theory, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
is equal to feedback Nash equilibrium. Obviously, this is not a limitation of
the Stackelberg equilibrium but the diﬀerential games.
3E x a m p l e s
In this Section we present and discuss diﬀerent economic models where the
leadership does not play any role.5 W eb e g i nw i t ha ne x a m p l ei nt h eﬁeld of
environmental economics.
3.1 International pollution control
A lot of papers have been published in the last years on the international co-
operation to control global environmental problems as the greenhouse eﬀect.
If we focus on the papers using diﬀerential game theory, we can quote the
ones published by Brito and Intriligator (1987), Long (1992), van der Ploeg
and de Zeeuw (1992) and Dockner and Long (1993).6
Brito and Intriligator (1987) and van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992)
present a model with N identical players, whereas Long (1992) and Dock-
ner and Long (1993) focus on a model with two identical players. Brito
and Intriligator study how the stock (state) externalities can be regulates by
Pigouvian taxation of the good that produces the externality in the frame-
work of a feedback Nash equilibrium. van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992)
compare the steady-state concentration levels of pollutants in the environ-
ment for the eﬃcient equilibrium, the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the
5A useful source for this Section has been the book published by Dockner et al. (2000).
6More recently, Zagonari (1998) and List and Mason (2001) have proposed some ex-
tensions of the linear quadratic pollution control model developed by Dockner and Long
(1993). Basically they introduce some asymmetry to address diﬀerent issues. Zagonari
studies the eﬀects on pollution of unilateral iniciatives, whereas List and Mason study
under what conditions would a decentralized environmental policy be preferable.
10feedback Nash equilibrium. They obtain that the feedback strategies in-
crease the ineﬃciency of the non-cooperative equilibrium in comparison with
the open-loop strategies giving a higher steady-state level of pollutant con-
centration. In Long (1992) an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is studied
whereas in Dockner and Long (1993) a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium
in non-linear strategies is calculated.
Next, we present the model developed by Dockner and Long (1993) and
show that the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the feedback
Nash equilibrium. In Dockner and Long’s model there is only one state vari-
able, x, that stands for the current stock of pollution, and u1 and u2,w i t h
α11 = α12 =1 , represent the pollutant emissions of countries 1 and 2 re-
spectively. Function f1(x) is equal to −kx,w i t hk>0,t h a tr e p r e s e n t st h e
natural puriﬁcation of the environment. They assume that the net bene-
ﬁt function is quadratic with respect to the pollution stock and emissions.
With these simpliﬁcations their pollution model becomes a linear quadratic




















s.t. ˙ x = u1 + u2 − kx, x(0) = x0 ≥ 0.
The equilibrium strategies of the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium of















i (x)[Ei + Ej − kx]

,i , j=1 ,2,i = j,
(14)
the f.o.c. for the maximization of the right-hand side of this equation yields
u
∗
i = A + V

i (x),i=1, 2. (15)

















By solving this partial diﬀerential equation and ﬁnding the value function,
Dockner and Long obtain the equilibrium strategies of the stationary feed-
back Nash equilibrium.
Now, let player 1 be the leader. Then the equilibrium strategy of the






















11The maximization of the right-hand side of the above equation yields the
s ame re s ul t that t he maxi mi z at i o n o f t he ri g ht - ha nd s i de of e q ua t i o n (1 4) .
This coincidence o ccurs b ecause the reacti on functions (15) are i ndep endent
of the control variable of the other player. Obviously, this result does not
depend on the symmetry assumption.
3.2 Common property resources
In the literature of natural resources one of the ﬁrst economic applications of
dynamic game theory is the paper written by Levhari and Mirman (1980).
In this paper, a stationary feedback Nash equilibrium in discrete time is uses
to study the interactions between two countries that exploit the same ﬁshery.
More recently, Benhabib and Radner (1992) and Dockner and Sorger (1996)
have investigated the existence and properties of equilibria for this class of
dynamic games proposed by Levhari and Mirman.
In Negri (1989) a diﬀerential game approach is applied to the analysis
of a common property aquifer. In Negri’s groundwater pumping diﬀerential
game, open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria are compared and it is shown
that feedback strategies exacerbate the ineﬃcient private exploitation of the
aquifer. Negri’s diﬀerential game has recently been revisited by Rubio and
Casino (2001). In their paper, they adapt the model deﬁned by Gisser and
Sánchez (1980) to study the eﬀects of strategic behavior on the eﬃciency of
private groundwater exploitation.
Next, we show that in this model the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
also coincides with the feedback Nash equilibrium. In Rubio and Casino’s
(2001) diﬀerential game x stands for the water table elevation of the aquifer
above some arbitrary reference level and ui represents the rate of extraction
of the representative farmer with α11 = α12 =( γ − 1), being γ, 0 < γ < 1,
the return ﬂow coeﬃcient. They assume that there are N identical farmers
pumping water from the same aquifer, however here we will assume that
N =2 . Function f1(x) is equal to escalar R, R > 0, that stands for the
natural recharge of the aquifer. The diﬀerential equation which describes the
dynamics of the water table is obtained as the diﬀerence between natural
recharge and net extractions
AS ˙ x = R +( γ − 1)(u1 + u2 ), (16)
where AS is area of the aquifer times storativity. Notice that the product
AS ˙ x gives the amount of water pumping from the aquifer in each moment.
The revenues of the farmers are given by a quadratic function of the rate
of extraction and the total cost of extraction depends on the rate of extraction
12and the depth of the water table: Ci(x,ui)=( c0 + c1x)ui, with c0 > 0 and
















ui − (c0 + c1x)ui

dt,
sub j ect to (16) and a given initial water tabl e elevation, where k is a negative


















[R +( γ − 1)(ui + uj)]

, (17)
i,j =1 ,2,i = j,

















Substituting, under the symmetry assumption, into (16) the following partial


























(R +( γ − 1)(g + kc0)).
In Rubio and Casino (2001) the equilibrium linear strategies of the stationary
feedback Nash equilibrium are calculated by solving this equation.
Stipulating now an asymmetry in the roles of the players, let farmer 1 be
the leader. In this case the equilibrium strategy of the leader have to satisfy

































From the maximization of the right-hand side we get the same strategy that
yi e l ds t he maxi mi z at i on of t he ri ght- hand s i de of e quat i on (17) and , c ons e-
quently, we will obtain the same partial diﬀerential equation than the one
13that characterizes the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium. This coinci-
de nc e o cc urs a ga i n b e c ause t he o pt i mal ext rac t i o n r a te g i ve n by (187 ) do e s
not depend on the rate extraction rate of the other farmer.
This result can be easily extended to the case of a renewable resource.
Come back to the case studied by Levhari and Mirman. For a restricted com-
mon property ﬁshery exploited by two countries, x stands for the ﬁsh popu-
lation and ui represents the harvesting rate of player i with γ =0 . Function
f1(x) is now the law of population growth that we can write as R(x).7 Then
for the case of a renewable resource the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation











ui − (c0 + c1x)ui
+V

i (x)[R(x) − ui − uj)]
r
,
i,j =1 ,2,i = j,
This equation also gives an optimal policy for the country i that is inde-
pendent of the harvesting rate of country j. Again the two equilibria will be
identical. The same occurs if we look at the case of a non-renewable resource
as one oilﬁeld exploited by two ﬁrms. For this case the above Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation must be only modiﬁed by writing R(x)=0 .8
3.3 Dynamic models of duopoly
Several papers were published at the end of the eighties proposing a dynamic
extension of traditional (static) duopoly theory. This kind of extension was
a natural way of explicitly introducing a time-dependent structure into the
model in order to analyse the strategic interdependence among ﬁrms in a
dynamic setting. This literature can be grouped in two blocks.
3.3.1 Dynamic duopoly with sticky prices
In 1987, Fershtman and Kamien studied dynamic duopolistic competition
under the assumption that the price of a homogeneous product does not
7An example is the Gomperts’ law of population growth: R(x)=x(a−ρlnx) used by
Dockner, Feichtinger and Mehlmann (1989) in their diﬀerential game model of ﬁshery.
8Notice that the coincidence between the two equilibria would occur only if the two
ﬁrms are price-taker. If the ﬁrms operate in an oligopolistic market a new interdependence
appers through the revenue functions and in that case the reaction fucntion of one ﬁrm
depends on the other ﬁrm’s extraction rate resulting in a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
that is diﬀerent from the feedback Nash equilibrium.
14adjust instantaneously to the price indicated by its demand function at the
given level of output. In their diﬀerential game, price is the state variable and
the state equation restricts price to evolve slowly. In 1990 they complete the
study of duopolistic competition considering a ﬁnite-horizon for the inﬁnite-
horizon diﬀerential game developed in their previous paper. Later on Tsutsui
and Mino (1990), Tsutsi (1996) and Piga (2000) have published diﬀerent
extensions of the Fershtman and Kamien’s model. Tsutsui and Mino (1990)
compute the stationary feedback Nash equilibrium in non-linear strategies,
Tsutsui (1996) introduces capacity constraints and Piga (2000) considers
that ﬁrms can invest in market-enlarging promotional activities (advertising)
which have a public good nature.
In Fershtman and Kamien’s (1987) diﬀerential game ui represents the ith
ﬁrm’s output rate and α11 = α12 = s where 0 <s≤∞denotes the speed
in which the price converges to its level on the demand function. Function
f1(x) is equal to s(a−x), where a>0 stands for the maximum price for the
output in the market. Thus, the dynamics of the price is governed by the
diﬀerential equation
˙ x = s(a − u1− u2− x), (19)
where a − (u1 + u2) is the price on the demand function for the given level
of output.
The authors assume a quadratic cost function so that the objective func-
















sub j ect to (19) and a given initial price. For this problem the asso ciated











i (x)(a − ui − uj − x)

i = j =1 ,2,i  = j,




i = x − c − sV

i (x),i=1 ,2.
Substituting these optimal strategies, under the symmetry assumption, into








2 + s(a +2 c − 3x)V






15By solving this partial diﬀerential equation, Fershtman and Kamien ﬁnd the
equilibrium strategies.
In order to calculate the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium of the game we
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Again, we obtain the same optimal policy than the one obtained for the
feedback Nash equilibrium and, consequently, the two equilibria coincide.
3.3.2 Dynamic duopoly with adjustment costs
In other papers the dynamics appear in the model from production or invest-
ment adjustment costs. See Fershtman and Muller (1984), Reynolds (1987)
and (1991), Maskin and Tirole (1987), Driskill and McCaﬀerty (1989) and
Dockner (1992). In Fershtman and Muller (1984) the existence and stability
of the open-loop Nash equilibrium are addressed. In Reynolds’ (1987) paper
it is assumed that the reduced form net revenue (sales revenue less produc-
tion costs) is a function of the capacities of the two ﬁrms and that there
exist non-linear costs to adjust the capacity. In Reynolds’ (1991) paper, he
extends his analysis of the duopoly to the case of an oligopoly with N ﬁrms.
On the other hand, in Driskill and McCaﬀerty (1989) and Dockner (1992),
the intrinsic dynamics of duopolistic competition arises from production ad-
justment costs. In these papers ﬁrms incur costs associated with how fast
they change their level of output so that the levels of output become the state
variables and the rates of change of output act as the control variables.9
In this Section we limit ourselves to comment the diﬀerential game de-
ﬁned by Reynolds (1987). In his model there are two state variables which
represent the capacity of the two ﬁrms, so that ui stands for the ith ﬁrm’s
gross investment with α11 = α22 =1and α12 = α21 =0 . Functions fj(x) are
equal to −δxi where δ ≥ 0 is the exponential rate of depreciation, then the
state equations are given by
˙ xi = ui−δ xi ,i=1, 2. (20)
The author assumes a quadratic function for the adjustment costs of the
capacity, and a linear demand function and technology that allows him to
9In Maskin and Tirole (1987) a discrete time Cournot model with adjustment costs
and alternating moves is presented. The authors assume that ﬁrms cannot change their
output plans for a given ﬁnite time (they are able to commit themselves for ﬁnite periods)
and move alternatingly.
16write the net revenue function as a function of capacities. The result is that















dt, i = j =1 ,2,i = j,
sub j ect t o t he state equations (20) and a give n i ni tial leve l f or capaciti es. For
this dynamic optimization problem the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation is written as follows
rVi(xi,x j)=m a x
{ui}
q








ii(xi,x j)(ui − δxi)+V

ij(xi,x j)(uj − δxj)
r
, (21)
i = j =1 ,2,i  = j,









ii(xi,x j)),i = j =1 ,2,i  = j.






























ij(xi,x j) − rVi(xi,x j)=−






The solution of this equation, under the assumption of symmetry, allows to
Reynolds to obtain the equilibrium strategies.
If ﬁrm 1 is the leader of the game the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation is
rV1(x1,x 2)=m a x
{u1}
q















22(x1,x 2)) − δx2)

, (23)









Then by substituting it into (23) we get a partial diﬀerenti al equati on i den-
tical t o t he ones that app e ar in (22). The othe r e quations i s obtai ned by
substitution of the optimal policy function of the leader into the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation of the follower.
173.4 Dynamic voluntary provision of public goods
In this Section we comment Fershtman and Nitzan’s (1991) paper that can
be viewed as an extension of the results obtained in the dynamic duopoly
literature, we have just presented, to the theory of voluntary provision of
public goods.10
In Fershtman and Nitzan’s diﬀerential game among N identical agents
that jointly carry out a certain project by making continuous contributions of
some input, x stands for the stock of total contributions and ui is interpreted
as the contribution rate of agent i being the parameters α1 = ... = αN =1 .
In this presentation we simplify the model assuming that N =2 . Function
f(x) is equal to −δx where δ ≥ 0 is the exponential rate of depreciation.
Then the total contribution x accumulates over time according to
xi = u1 + u2−δ x, (24)
The cost of contribution and the beneﬁt from the public good for agent
i are given by quadratic functions. They further assume that the objective
















dt, i =1, 2, (25)
sub j ect to (24) f or a gi ven initi al val ue of the total contributions.α in (25)
represents how subtractable is the good. For α =1 /2 the project involves the
production of a typical private good. If α =1 , the good can be interpreted
as a pure public good. Using the value function approach the equilibrium












i (x)(ui + uj − δx)
r
,i =1 ,2,i = j.
The maximization of the right-hand side yields u∗
i = V

i (x)/c and by sub-
stitution of this optimal policy, assuming that the two value functions are








i (x) − rVi(x)=−α(ax − bx
2).
By solving this equation and ﬁnding the value function Vi(x), Fershtman and
Nitzan ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies.
10More recently, Itaya and Shimomura (2001) have used a similar diﬀerential game to
study the sign of the conjectural variations at the steady state in the dynamic private
provision of public goods.
18Now, let us assume that player 1 enjoys a ﬁrst-movement advantage.




















and we get that u∗
1 = V

1(x)/c, exactly the same optimal policy function than
the one obtained for the feedback Nash equilibrium.
3.5 Competitive arms race
The conﬂict between West and East over arms accumulation has been studied
using diﬀerential game theory by Brito (1972), Simaan and Cruz (1975),
Deger and Sen (1984) and, more recently, by van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw
(1990). In these models the welfare of one country depends on the level of
security which is perceived to be an increasing function of its own weapon
stock and a decreasing function of the foreign weapon stock. In Brito (1972)
and Deger and Sen (1984) the open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is
characterized and in Simaan and Cruz (1975) and van der Ploeg and de
Zeeuw (1990), the feedback Nash equilibrium.
In van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw’s diﬀerential game there are two state
variables which represent the weapon stocks of the two regions. ui denotes
the level of governments investment in arms with α11 = α22 =1and α12 =
α21 =0 . Functions fj(x) are equal to −δxi where δ ≥ 0 is the depreciation
rate. The arms accumulation evolves according to
xi = ui−δ xi ,i=1, 2. (26)
The authors assume that utility is separable in defence and that defence
depends on the diﬀerence between the weapon stocks of the two regions. For




















i =1 ,2,i = j,
sub j ect to state equation (26) and a gi ven i nitial level f or weap on sto cks,
being all parameters θ positive except θ1 that must be negative. For this dy-
namic optimization problem the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equa-
tion is written as follows
rVi(xi,x j)=m a x
{ui}













ii(xi,x j)(ui − δxi)
+V

ij(xi,x j)(uj − δxj)
r
, (27)
where i = j =1 ,2,i  = j.
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By solving this system, under the assumption that both value functions are
identical, van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies.
I fn o ww ea s s u m et h a tt h eW e s t ,p l a y e rn u m b e r1 ,c o u l db et h el e a d e ro f
this game, its equilibrium strategy should be satisfy
rV1(x1,x 2)=m a x
{u1}




























but from this equation the same equilibrium strategy than in the feedback
Nash equilibrium is obtained.
To close this Section we would like to highlight that the coincidence be-
tween the two equilibria concepts in this class of diﬀerential games does not
depend on the asymmetry assumption. This assumption is just used in order
to reduce the system of partial diﬀerential equations to one and facilitate in
this way the calculation of the equilibrium strategies. In other words, if any
asymmetric version of the diﬀerential games presented in this Section could
be solved the coincidence between the two equilibria would occur as well.
204 Control externalities
In this Section we show that the coincidence between the two equilibria
studied in this paper can also appear in games where the strategic inter-
dependence also comes through the control variables. In fact, it is easy to
ﬁnd suﬃcient conditions for getting this result in diﬀerential games. Let us
assume that
Remark 1 (Assumption) The ﬁrst derivatives ∂vi/∂ui and ∂fj/∂ui,j=
1,...,n are independents of uk,i= k =1 ,2 and i  = k.
Then we have that
Proposition 4 If Remark 1 is satisﬁed, the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
coincides with the feedback Nash equilibrium independently of which player
acts as the leader.
Proof. For the general problem (DG), the equilibrium Nash strategies
must satisfy (4). I f Assumption 1 hol ds, the maximi zation of the right-hand










ji(x,ui)=0 ,i =1 ,2,
and we ﬁnd that u∗
1 = T1(x) and u∗
2 = T2(x). Now, we can follow the proof
of Prop. 3 to conclude that the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is identical
to the feedback Nash equilibrium. 
A corollary from this result is
Corollary 1 Let us assume that ∂vi/∂ui and ∂fj/∂ui,j=1 ,...,n are inde-
pendents of uk b u tt h a tt h ec o n t r a r yi sn o tt r u ef o ri = k =1 ,2 and i  = k,
t h e nt h e r ee x i s t so n l yo n ef e e d b a c kS t a c k e l b e r ge q u i l i b r i u mf o rt h eg a m ew h e r e
player i is the leader and player k is the follower.
Proof. If the ﬁrst derivatives ∂vi/∂ui and ∂fj/∂ui are independent of uk
we know that u∗
i = Ti(x). If the contrary is not true, the maximization of the










jk(x,ui,u k)=0 ,i = k =1 ,2,i = k,
21which implicitly deﬁnes the reaction function of player k, u∗
k = Tk(ui;x).
Given these relationships betwwen the players, player i can inﬂuence the
behavior of player k, b u tt h i si sn o tt h ec a s ef o rp l a y e rk. Consequently, in
the unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium that the game admits player k
is the follower and player i the leader. 
In order to illustrate these results we now comment two examples of
asymmetric diﬀerential games.
4.1 Optimal dynamic proﬁt taxation
In Gradus (1991) the optimal proﬁt taxation for a welfare maximizing govern-
ment in a dynamic framework is studied using the diﬀerential game theory.
In his model, x stands for the capital stock of the representative ﬁrm. The
capital accumulation evolves according to
x = u2 − δx, (27)
where u2 is the investment of the ﬁrm and δ ≥ 0 the capital depreciation
rate. For our notation player 2 is the representative ﬁrm. The net revenues
depend on the corporate tax rate and on the capital stock according to the
following expression: (1 − u1)ax, where u1 denotes the corporate rate and
a is a constant that represents the marginal productivity of capital. In the
paper it is assumed that the production function presents constant returns







−rt((1 − u1)ax − u2 − ϕ(u2))dt,
s ub j e ct t o s t a te e quat i on ( 2 8) and a gi ven i ni t i al l e ve l o f c api t al s t o ck. In
this expression, ϕ(u2) represents the internal adjustment costs of the ﬁrm.
On the other hand, it is assumed that the government, player 1, has the
same utility function as the representative consumer, that public consump-
tion will be ﬁnanced from proﬁt taxation, and that there is no debt. The
utility depends on private and public consumption and assuming a Cobb-







−βt (αln((1 − u1)ax + whx− u2 − ϕ(u2)) + (1 − α)lnu1ax)dt,
sub j ect to state equation (28) and the ini tial l evel of capi tal sto ck. I n this ex-
pression w stands for the real wage rate and hx gives the number of employed
22workers. Notice that in this diﬀerential game the government’s discount rate
is diﬀerent of the ﬁrm’s interest rate.






















So that there exists a unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium which is dif-
ferent from the feedback Nash equilibrium. For this equilibrium player 2, the
ﬁrm, is the leader and player 1, the government, is the follower. Notice that
∂v1/∂u1 depends on u2 but ∂v2/∂u2 does not depend on u1.
Given these derivatives it is easy to see that the optimal investment of
the ﬁrm does not depend on the government’s tax rate. In the feedback
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For the government, the tax rate and the investment are strategic substi-
tutes, however for the ﬁrm the optimal investment only depends on the level
of the state variable (capital stock).
4.2 Strategic pigouvian taxation with stock externali-
ties
Several papers have recently been published where the authors develop a
model of long-term bilateral interaction between a resource-exporting cartel
23and a coalition of governments of resource-importing countries. See Wirl
(1994, 1995), Wirl and Dockner (1995), Tahvonen (1996) and Rubio and
Escriche (2001). In this framework, they have studied the strategic taxa-
tion of CO2 emissions by the governments of the importing countries and
thus have clariﬁed which are the determinants of the carbon tax dynamics
when the strategic behavior of the agents is taken into account. Wirl (1994)
and Wirl and Dockner focus on the feedback Nash equilibrium of the game.
Tahvonen studies the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium when the resource-
exporting cartel acts as the leader11, and Rubio and Escriche characterize the
other feedback Stackelebrg equilibrium for which the coalition of resource-
importing countries acts as the leader.
In the diﬀerential game analyzed by Rubio and Escriche, x stands for cu-
mulative emissions. The control variable of the government of the importing
countries, u1, is a tax on emissions, and the control variable of the cartel,
u2, is the producer price of the resource. The resource demand depends
o nt h ec o n s u m e rp r i c e ,a n dt h ed y n a m i c so fc u m u l a t i v er e s o u r c ec o n s u m p -
tion determine simultaneously the dynamics of the CO2 concentration in the
atmosphere according to the following equation12
˙ x = a − u1− u2 , (29)
where u1+u2 is the consumer price and a the independent term of the demand
function.
The government of the importing countries tax emissions in order to max-
imize the discounted present value of the net consumers’ surplus. They reim-
burse tax revenues as lump-sum transfers to consumers, so that the after-tax
consumers’ net welfare does not depend on tax revenues. The optimal time









a(a − u1 − u2) −
1
2
(a − u1 − u2)
2
−u2 (a− u1− u2 )−εx
2 
dt ,
gi ven the state equation (29) and an i nitial value for cumul ated emissions.
In this expression εx2 is the pollution damage function and the rest the net
11In Tahvonen’s paper the proposed feedback Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the
feedback Nash equilibrium but the author does not explicitly recognized this because he
does not calculate this last equilibrium.
12Cumulative extractions can be used as a proxy of CO2 concentration if emissions are
assumed irreversible.

















On the other hand, the authors assume that extraction costs depend
linearly on the rate of extraction and on the cumulative extraction. Then,
the objective of the cartel of producers is to deﬁne a price strategy that






−rt((u2 − cx)(a − u1 − u2))dt,
given the state equation (28) and an initial value for cumulated emissions.
In this last expression cx is the marginal(=average) cost of extraction. This
implies that extraction costs increase with cumulative extractions.














Then, by Corollary 1 we can conclude that there exists only one feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium for the diﬀerential game for which the leader is the
coalition of importing countries and the follower the cartel of exporting coun-
tries.
255 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the scope of the applicability of the Stack-
elberg equilibrium concept in diﬀerential games. Our results show that for a
class of diﬀerential games with state-interdependence the stationary feedback
Stackelberg equilibrium coincides with the stationary feedback Nash equilib-
rium. For this class of diﬀerential games the strategic interdependence among
the agents occurs only through the dynamics of the sate variable. Then,
since the asymmetry in the roles of the players in a continuous-time feed-
back Stackelberg equilibrium is only incremental, the feedback Stackelberg
equilibrium is identical to the feedback Nash equilibrium. Nevertheless, this
result is more general and applies for a broader class of diﬀerential games.
As u ﬃcient condition for getting this coincidence is that the reaction func-
tions of the players be orthogonal with respect to the control variables. A
review of diﬀerent economic applications of diﬀerential games shows that the
feedback Stackelberg equilibrium is identical to the feedback Nash equilib-
rium for a good number of interesting economic applications what means
that this result is pretty general. At least, it is going to appear in all the eco-
n o m i cm o d e l si nc o n t i n u o u st i m ew i t hs t o c ke x t e r n a l i t i e st h a tc o v e ri s s u e sa s
the global warming problem, the exploitation of common property resources,
both renewable and non-renewable, the dynamic provision of public goods
and the competitive arms race.
This result restricts the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium con-
cept in diﬀerential games. In order to avoid this restriction the calculation of
non-degenerate feedback Stackelberg equilibria has been proposed, see Dock-
ner at el. (2000, 5.3). However, this procedure also presents some problems.
Mainly, using this approach one solves a game with feedback strategies for
the follower but with open-loop strategies for the leader. Another alternative
is to change the framework and use a discrete-time approach for the analysis
of leadership in a dynamic setting, see Ba¸ sar and Olsder (1999, Chap. 7).
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